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LET THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME:  
SANCTIONING ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS FOR 
FAILURE TO RESPOND TO POSTCERTIFICATION 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
Elizabeth A. Kalenik* 
 
Courts rarely allow defendants to take discovery of absent class members 
after class action certification.  However, if a court does permit such 
discovery and some absentees fail to respond, should the court sanction the 
nonresponsive absentees?  Under what circumstances should the court 
dismiss the nonresponsive absentees?  When considering whether and what 
sanctions to impose, courts make a decision about the rights and role of 
absentees in class actions. 
This Note examines postcertification absentee discovery sanctions 
through a discussion of group litigation.  Next, it analyzes the reasoning of 
courts that have dismissed absentees, declined to dismiss absentees, and 
imposed other sanctions on absentees.  Finally, this Note concludes that 
courts should generally dismiss opt-out absentees without prejudice, and 
dismiss opt-in absentees with prejudice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action, a group of retail store managers 
allege that their employer incorrectly classified them as exempt from laws 
mandating overtime wages.1  After the class is certified, the employer 
attempts to derail the class action by showing that it properly classified the 
employees as managerial employees.  To this end, the employer moves to 
serve interrogatories on the employees, seeking information about their job 
duties.  The court permits the discovery, but more than half of the 
employees fail to respond.  The employer is now prejudiced because it lacks 
information that is crucial for its defense.  Accordingly, the employer 
moves to dismiss the nonresponsive absentees.  However, if the court orders 
dismissal, the employees must either opt in by completing the discovery or 
be excluded.  How can the court ameliorate the employer’s prejudice 
without distorting the opt-out scheme of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action?2 
 
 1. The facts described in this paragraph mirror the facts in Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, 
Inc., Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC, 2011 WL 843956 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011). See infra 
notes 296–302 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 347–51 and accompanying text. 
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Postcertification discovery of absentees is rarely used and is neither 
precluded nor endorsed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).3  
However, most courts have concluded that such discovery may be 
permissible where it is not being used to harass the absentees and the 
defendant cannot obtain the information from the class representative(s).4  
Yet, when such discovery is undertaken and some absentees fail to respond, 
courts are divided on whether and how to sanction the nonresponsive 
absentees.5 
In Part I, this Note explores group litigation procedure, the due process 
rights of absent members, and discovery sanctions.  In so doing, Part I 
provides a background for understanding the arguments addressed in Part 
II.  Part II analyzes the decisions of courts that have dismissed 
nonresponsive absentees, courts that have declined to dismiss 
nonresponsive absentees, and courts that have imposed other sanctions on 
nonresponsive absentees.  In Part III, this Note argues that courts should 
generally dismiss nonresponsive absentees without prejudice in opt-out 
actions, and with prejudice in opt-in actions. 
I.  SETTING THE STAGE:  ALL ABOUT GROUP LITIGATION 
This part provides the context for the conflict with an overview of the 
types of group litigation in which courts have ordered absent member 
discovery.  First, Part I.A examines two types of federal group litigation:  
Rule 23 class actions and Fair Labor Standards Act6 (FLSA) collective 
actions.  Part I.B examines the procedure of state class actions.  When 
discussing state class actions, Part I.B focuses on the procedures of 
California and Alaska, two states that have considered whether to dismiss 
nonresponsive absentees. 
Next, Part I.C turns to a discussion of the due process rights of Rule 23 
absentees, an issue that figures in plaintiffs’ arguments against sanctioning 
nonresponsive members.  Part I.D then examines when, how often, and in 
what types of cases federal and state courts have ordered absentee 
discovery.  Part I concludes with an overview of federal and state discovery 
sanctions, many of which courts have considered imposing on absentees. 
A.  Federal Group Litigation:  Rule 23 Class Actions and Fair Labor 
Standards Act Collective Actions 
This section discusses Rule 23 class actions and FLSA class actions, two 
kinds of aggregate litigation in which courts have ordered discovery and 
ultimately sanctioned nonresponsive absentees.  First, this section examines 
the history, procedural mechanisms, and policies behind Rule 23 class 
 
 3. See infra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 147, 160–64 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
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actions.  Second, this section considers the history, procedural mechanisms, 
and policies behind FLSA collective actions. 
1.  Rule 23:  History, Policy, and Certification Procedures 
A class action is a form of group litigation in which a class representative 
sues on behalf of many people who have suffered the same harm.7  
Traditionally, it is said that the representative is the named plaintiff, and the 
members of the class are the absent members.8  The named plaintiff stands 
in judgment for the absent members.9  The individual members need not be 
present; by being adequately represented,10 each member has “the 
functional equivalent of a day in court.”11  Accordingly, if there is any 
judgment in the action, the judgment binds all the members of the class.12 
The procedure of class actions was originally an equitable mechanism 
developed to resolve common disputes in an efficient manner.13  In federal 
court, class actions are governed by FRCP 23.14  Rule 23 was created to 
protect the rights of class members and defendants, assure efficiency in 
litigation and remedies, and assist in law enforcement.15  By encompassing 
all members that meet a class definition, class actions efficiently resolve 
claims with less risk of contrary judgments.16  For defendants, class actions 
can be an opportunity to obtain a “bill of peace” on a set of identical claims 
by resolving all those claims at the same time.17 
Further, class actions assist in regulation because the mechanism enables 
plaintiffs to sue for small injuries by combining many claims.18  By 
combining many claims, the plaintiff has more resources with which to 
combat the defendant.19  In turn, class action litigation of such claims can 
 
 7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 1:1, at 2 (5th ed. 2011); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21, at 
358–59 (2012) (explaining that a class action aggregates claims and thus can “increase the 
stakes” of the litigation). 
 8. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:5, at 12. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Class members are represented by a class representative and class counsel. See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), 23(g). 
 11. 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1786, at 
496 (3d ed. 2005). 
 12. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:5, at 12. 
 13. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Pre-certification Communication Ethics in Class Actions, 36 
GA. L. REV. 353, 359 (2002); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) advisory committee’s note (1937 
Adoption) (noting that Rule 23 is a restatement of the former Equity Rule 38). 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 15. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive 
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1259–60 (2002). 
 16. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:9, at 26–27. 
 17. See id. § 1:9, at 27. 
 18. See id. § 1:7, at 18. 
 19. See id. § 1:7, at 19. 
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put pressure on repeat defendants to obey laws that might not otherwise be 
enforced.20 
Absent members have few duties in class action litigation because the 
named plaintiff actively participates in the litigation on behalf of the class.21  
For instance, absent members generally do not have to appear before court 
or hire counsel.22  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “an absent class-
action plaintiff is not required to do anything.  He may sit back and allow 
the litigation to run its course.”23 
Rule 23 does not address the duties of absent members.24  Thus, courts 
disagree about whether absent members should be subject to certain duties, 
such as the duty to answer discovery requests25 and to be subject to 
counterclaims.26  When making a decision about the duties of the absentees 
in a particular case, courts should consider the goals of the particular 
litigation.27  Generally, courts should ensure that the absent members’ 
rights are represented at each stage of the litigation.28  Additionally, courts 
should seek to maintain the efficiency of class actions and judicial 
economy.29  In Part I.D, this Note considers how courts have applied this 
analysis to absent member discovery. 
A class action begins when the class representative files a complaint on 
behalf of a purported class.30  The court then determines whether the class 
can be certified.31  Because any judgment binds all absent members,32 
 
 20. See Bone & Evans, supra note 15, at 1260 n.22 (explaining that individual plaintiffs’ 
claims are too small to pursue in securities fraud and antitrust cases and thus some securities 
and antitrust laws would be underenforced without the class action mechanism). But see 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:  The Implications of Economic 
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 669, 680 (1986) (noting that class actions carry a risk of overenforcement, because a 
fee-motivated plaintiffs’ attorney might sue where a class member might be more concerned 
about the negative long-term impacts of the litigation). 
 21. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985); see also 1 
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:5, at 12–13. 
 22. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 810. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; 5 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 16:1, at 118 (4th ed. 2002). 
 25. See infra Part I.D. 
 26. See 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 16:1, at 120. 
 27. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002) (“The label ‘party’ does not 
indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability of various 
procedural rules that may differ based on context.”); see also 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra 
note 24, § 16:1, at 120 (explaining that courts can consider the circumstances under which 
the absent members’ duties have become relevant). 
 28. See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10. 
 29. See id. at 11 (citing Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 629 (11th Cir. 1987) (observing 
that one of the purposes of class action litigation is “preventing multiple suits”); Jeremy 
Bertsch, Note, Missing the Mark:  The Search for an Effective Class Certification Process, 
39 VAL. U. L. REV. 95, 116 (2004). 
 30. See Bassett, supra note 13, at 360. 
 31. See id. at 363. 
 32. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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certifying a class of members with the same interests is critical.33  Such a 
binding judgment would be unfair if the class members did not have 
common interests.34  Accordingly, the Rule 23(a) requirements ensure that 
the class members have the same interests and that maintaining a class 
action is feasible.35  Additionally, all class actions must satisfy the 
requirements of one of the three Rule 23(b) class types.36  The Rule 23(b) 
requirements further ensure class cohesion by limiting the kinds of class 
actions that can be maintained.37 
The Rule 23(a) requirements are numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequacy.38  Under the numerosity requirement, the class must be so 
large that it is impractical to join the claims of all the class members.39  The 
commonality requirement ensures that questions of law or fact are common 
to the class.40  To satisfy the typicality requirement, the claims of the class 
representative(s) must be typical of the claims of the absent members.41  
Finally, under the adequacy requirement, the named plaintiff must “fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class.”42  As this Note will later 
discuss in Part I.C, adequacy is one of the mechanisms that protects absent 
members’ due process rights.43 
After a class action meets the Rule 23(a) requirements, it must meet the 
requirements of either (b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3).44  There are two 
subcategories of Rule 23(b)(1) class actions.45  Both kinds of (b)(1) class 
actions are mandatory class actions, meaning that absent members cannot 
 
 33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Bone & Evans, supra note 15, at 1261–62 (explaining that 
proper class certification is critical because judgment in a Rule 23 action precludes absent 
members from bringing their claims to court again). 
 34. Such a class action would violate due process requirements because the absent 
members’ interests would not be represented in court. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 
42–43 (1940). 
 35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 36. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 37. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:3, at 5. 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 39. Id. 23(a)(1); see Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 
1995) (citing 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3.05 (2d ed. 1985)) 
(explaining that numerosity is presumed where there are forty class members or more). 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).  Commonality of all issues of law or fact is not required; a 
core of shared legal issues or facts satisfies the commonality requirement. See Hanlon v. 
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 41. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).  Courts have struggled to define the meaning of the 
typicality requirement as distinguished from the adequacy requirement.  Some courts have 
concluded that the typicality requirement strengthens the adequacy requirement, and assures 
that the representative will adequately represent the absent members. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 11, § 1764, at 259–60. 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).  Adequacy must be scrutinized because “the fate of the class 
members is to a considerable extent in the hands of a single plaintiff,” and the named 
plaintiff may have no stake or a nominal stake in the class action. Culver v. City of 
Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 43. See infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text. 
 44. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 45. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). 
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request exclusion from the class.46  Accordingly, courts are permitted, but 
not required, to notify the members of the class action.47 
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class actions are incompatible standards class actions 
and are appropriate where prosecuting individual actions would create a risk 
of inconsistent judgments.48  These class actions are mandatory because 
allowing plaintiffs to sue individually would undermine the goal of 
reaching a consistent judgment.49  Situations where a (b)(1)(A) class action 
can be maintained include individual suits concerning a riparian owner’s 
rights and individual suits against a landowner regarding a nuisance.50 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions are known as limited fund class actions.51  
These class actions are permitted where prosecuting individual claims 
would be dispositive of other individual claims.52  However, in practice, 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions have been limited to cases that involve a 
finite recovery fund.53  If class members sought relief from a finite fund 
individually, the fund could be drained, precluding or depleting recovery 
for other individuals.54  Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions are mandatory 
because permitting individual suits would undermine the goal of fairly 
distributing the available funds.55 
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are known as injunctive relief class actions.56  
In (b)(2) class actions, the defendant has acted or refused to act in a way 
that generally applies to the whole class, making declaratory or injunctive 
relief appropriate.57  Like (b)(1) class actions, (b)(2) class actions are 
mandatory class actions.58  Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are mandatory 
because the relief sought necessarily applies to the entire class.59  
Accordingly, court notice to the class members is permitted but not 
required.60 
 
 46. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A). 
 47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1), (c)(2)(A). 
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A); see also 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:3, at 5–6. 
 49. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4:2, at 11–12  
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note (1966 Amendment). 
 51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4:23, at 88. 
 52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). 
 53. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 21.142, at 380–81 (noting 
that in (b)(1)(B) class actions, the judge must find that there is a limited fund and that the 
fund would be exhausted). 
 54. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 849–50 (1999) (decertifying a 
(b)(1) class in a suit against an asbestos manufacturer, because there was no evidence that 
the fund was limited and insufficient). 
 55. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4:2, at 13–14. 
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4:26, at 97. 
 57. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); see, e.g., Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 
1998) (affirming the certification of a (b)(2) class where aliens charged with document fraud 
sued the Immigration and Naturalization Service, alleging that the agency’s nationwide 
procedures violated their Fifth Amendment right to due process). 
 58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (permitting, but not requiring, notice of class 
certification to the class members); 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4:26, at 98. 
 59. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011). 
 60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2), (c)(2)(A). 
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Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, known as damages class actions, are 
appropriate where common issues predominate over individual issues, and 
using class action procedure is a superior way to fairly and efficiently 
adjudicate the dispute.61  It is often less clear that class action treatment is 
appropriate in damages class actions than in mandatory class actions, 
because individual issues may be significant.62  Accordingly, a (b)(3) class 
action must meet the predominance and superiority requirements.63  When 
analyzing predominance, courts assess whether common questions 
predominate over individual questions.64  In doing so, courts compare 
individual claims and defenses to common claims and defenses.65  In 
deciding whether a class action is a superior method, the court must 
consider the members’ interest in maintaining individual actions, whether 
and what kind of litigation has already been started by the class members, 
how desirable it is to maintain the claims in that particular forum, and the 
difficulties of managing the action.66 
Because damages class actions may be less cohesive than mandatory 
class actions,67 damages class actions permit members to request exclusion 
from the class in a so-called “opt-out mechanism.”68  If an absent member 
is excluded from the class, any judgment in the action will not bind that 
member.69  Additionally, (b)(3) absent members have the right to 
participate in the action by intervening in person or through an attorney.70  
Accordingly, courts must send “the best notice practicable” to the class 
members in clear and concise language.71 
After the class is certified, the court can consider the claims and defenses 
of the parties.72  However, certification legitimizes the class, which puts 
pressure on the defendant to settle the claims.73  For defendants, the 
 
 61. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
624–25 (1997) (holding that the predominance requirement was not satisfied by the class 
members’ exposure to asbestos and interest in receiving compensation; in fact, each 
member’s case was unique because the class members had different injuries and varying 
exposure to asbestos). 
 62. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966 Amendment). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 21.142, at 382. 
 65. See id. 
 66. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). 
 67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
 69. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 70. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
 71. Id.; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 21.31, at 459–60. 
 72. See Jeff Kosseff, Note, The Elusive Value:  Protecting Privacy During Class Action 
Discovery, 97 GEO. L.J. 289, 295 (2008). 
 73. See id. (citing THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY 
OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS:  FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 61 (1996), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf). 
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possibility of an “all-or-nothing verdict” can be too risky, even if there is a 
low probability of a plaintiffs’ verdict.74 
While class actions can be a useful aggregative device, class actions are 
often brought by “entrepreneurial” lawyers, carry a risk of unmanageability, 
and can skew the outcome of a trial.75  Plaintiffs’ class action attorneys are 
incentivized to act as entrepreneurs in their own interest, because they stand 
to gain large fees from the litigation and are not closely monitored by free 
rider absent members.76  Because of the entrepreneurial nature of class 
actions, class actions are driven by attorney’s fees rather than by the 
interests of the class.77  Where a plaintiffs’ attorney’s interests are 
unaligned with the interests of the class, an attorney may act contrary to the 
interests of the class.78  Further, when individual issues or damages play a 
prominent role in a class action, the action may become unmanageable.79  
Finally, by combining many claims into one litigation, class actions raise 
the stakes of the litigation for the defendant.80  As such, class actions 
increase the chances that the defendant will be held liable.81 
2.  Party Plaintiffs:  Fair Labor Standards Act Collective Actions 
Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act allows an employee to 
bring an action on behalf of “similarly situated” employees against an 
employer for unpaid wages.82  FLSA collective actions differ from Rule 23 
 
 74. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 75. See generally Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems:  
Variations and Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 401–03 
(2003) (discussing the drawbacks of American class actions and comparing them to foreign 
group litigation devices). 
 76. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in 
Class Action and Derivative Litigation:  Economic Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1991). But see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action 
Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2056–57 (2010) (arguing that class 
actions lawyers should receive 100 percent of the settlement proceeds in small stakes cases, 
because those cases serve a deterrence function, not a compensation function); Myriam 
Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:  The Social 
Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105–07 (2007) (arguing that 
class counsel overcompensation and class member undercompensation should be of little 
concern, because class actions serve the purpose of deterring corporate wrongdoing). 
 77. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 680. 
 78. See Macey & Miller, supra note 76, at 12–13. 
 79. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) 
(decertifying a class of one and a half million women alleging sex discrimination in a Rule 
23(b)(2) class action, because there was no common answer as to why the women were 
discriminated against). 
 80. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 81. See id. 
 82. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
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class actions in both certification and discovery procedure.83  While the 
certification procedure of Rule 23 class actions varies depending on the 
type of class action and claims asserted,84 all FLSA actions are opt-in 
actions.85  This means that the members must affirmatively consent to be 
included in the judgment.86  The consenting members are known as “party 
plaintiffs.”87  Additionally, unlike Rule 23 class actions, discovery of FLSA 
members is a regular occurrence.88 
The FLSA was enacted in 1938 to combat substandard workplace 
conditions that were detrimental to the health and well-being of workers.89  
Among other reforms, the FLSA set a minimum wage and required 
overtime pay for work over forty hours a week.90  FLSA provisions are 
mainly enforced through collective actions brought under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 216(b).91  Additionally, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 are enforced under 
§ 216(b).92 
Courts have split on § 216(b) certification procedure.93  Section 216(b) 
itself does not provide any guidance on how to determine whether a group 
of employees is “similarly situated.”94  Most courts take an “ad hoc” two-
step approach when deciding whether the employees are similarly situated, 
although a minority of courts apply Rule 23(a) requirements.95 
The two-step certification process involves taking an “ad hoc” look at 
whether the employees in the action are similarly situated.96  In the first 
step, the court reviews the complaint and supporting affidavits to determine 
whether a group of similarly situated employees exists.97  If the court finds 
 
 83. See Khadera v. ABM Indus. Inc., No. C08-417RSM, 2011 WL 3651031, at *1 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 18, 2011) (comparing the opt-in provision of § 216(b) to Rule 23); 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 32.42, at 811. 
 84. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 85. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft:  How Courts Use Procedural Rules To 
Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 727, 730–31 
(2010). 
 90. See id. at 731. 
 91. See James M. Fraser, Note, Opt-In Actions Under the FLSA, EPA, and ADEA:  What 
Does It Mean To Be “Similarly Situated”?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 99 & n.35 (2005). 
 92. See id. at 105. 
 93. See Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action:  How Courts 
Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 535 (2012). 
 94. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
 95. See Moss & Ruan, supra note 93, at 535–36. 
 96. The first case to employ the two-step process was Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 
F.R.D. 351, 361–63 (D.N.J. 1987); see also Allan G. King & Camille C. Ozumba, Strange 
Fiction:  The “Class Certification” Decision in FLSA Collective Actions, 24 LAB. LAW. 267, 
275 (2009) (explaining the procedure of the Lusardi two-step). 
 97. See Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2007).  Because the 
first-step certification decision is based on pleadings and affidavits, the first-step certification 
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that the complaint identifies a group of similarly situated employees, the 
class is conditionally certified.98  Notice of the collective action is sent to 
the employees, and the employees must return the consent form to the court 
to be included in the action.99 
During the second step, the defendant employer ordinarily makes a 
motion to decertify the class, and the court reviews whether the members 
are similarly situated with more scrutiny.100  The parties serve discovery on 
class members to determine whether the members are in fact similarly 
situated.101  Unlike Rule 23 class actions, courts have broad discretion to 
order class-wide or representative sampling discovery of plaintiffs in FLSA 
collective actions.102  In deciding whether the plaintiffs are similarly 
situated, the court can consider the employees’ placement and locations, the 
employer’s defenses against individual plaintiffs, and fairness and 
procedural considerations.103  If the court finds that the plaintiffs are not 
similarly situated, the class is decertified and the plaintiffs are dismissed 
without prejudice.104  If the court finds that the plaintiffs are similarly 
situated, the named plaintiff(s) and the defendant proceed to the merits of 
the case.105 
Under the Rule 23(a) approach, the court determines whether the class is 
similarly situated by analyzing whether the class satisfies the 23(a) 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements.106  At 
least one court has recognized that the opt-in mechanism of § 216(b) is 
contrary to the opt-out mechanism of Rule 23 class actions.107  However, 
the court reasoned that this discrepancy does not necessarily make every 
 
standard is lenient. See id. (citing Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1214 (5th 
Cir. 1995)). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170–71 (1989) (holding that 
plaintiffs can seek court assistance in finding and notifying similarly situated members). 
 100. See Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953. 
 101. See 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1807, at 495–96; see, e.g., Anderson, 488 
F.3d at 953 (explaining that discovery informs the second step of the process). 
 102. See Smith v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 354, 357–58 (S.D. Ohio 2006) 
(surveying cases discussing FLSA discovery procedure and concluding that representative 
sampling discovery is appropriate during step-two certification of a 1,500 employee class); 
Coldiron v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. CV03–05865TJHMCX, 2004 WL 2601180, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 25, 2004) (permitting individualized discovery of 306 employees, because Pizza Hut 
intended to challenge certification by alleging that the employees were not similarly 
situated); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1807, at 486. 
 103. See Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953 (citing Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 
1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213 
(5th Cir. 1995) (noting that Lusardi and other two-step cases do not define “similarly 
situated” and that, therefore, FLSA cases are analyzed on a case-by-case basis). 
 104. Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 268 (D. Colo. 1990). But 
see Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001) (arguing that 
the Rule 23(a) certification procedure runs contrary to Congress’s intent). 
 107. See Shushan, 132 F.R.D. at 266 (citing Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527 F.2d 532, 
536 (8th Cir. 1975); LaChapelle v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
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part of Rule 23 inapplicable to FLSA collective actions, and the Rule 23(a) 
approach provides structure in the certification process.108 
B.  State Class Action Certification Procedure 
This section explores the class action procedure used by states that have 
considered whether to dismiss nonresponsive members.  It focuses on the 
procedure of two states that have produced two of the leading cases on 
absentee postcertification discovery sanctions:  Alaska and California.  In 
so doing, this section creates a background for the discussion of these cases 
in Part II. 
State procedural rules fall into three categories with respect to class 
action procedure:  Field Code states, original Rule 23 states, and amended 
Rule 23 states.  In Field Code states, class action procedure is governed by 
the Field Code, the influential procedural reform code of the 1800s.109  
Original Rule 23 states use the original version of Rule 23, in which class 
action procedure is determined by the type of claim being asserted.110  
Amended Rule 23 states use one of the amended versions of modern Rule 
23, certifying class actions under an older version of Rule 23(a) and 
23(b).111 
California uses Field Code class action procedure.112  In the Field Code, 
class certification is based on the straightforward rule that “[W]hen the 
question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when 
the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all 
before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the 
whole.”113  Field Code procedure requires that there be an ascertainable 
class and interest in the common issues.114 
Alaska’s class action certification procedure tracks federal Rule 23 class 
action certification procedure.115  Although some wording in Alaska’s Rule 
 
 108. See id. 
 109. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code:  A 
Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 327–34 
(1988) (discussing the features of the Field Code and their relation to modern procedural 
rules). 
 110. See 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 13:3, at 400. 
 111. See id. § 13:4, at 401–02; see also Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in 
State Civil Justice:  Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a 
Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (2005) (surveying 
variations in state class action discovery rules). 
 112. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 2007). 
 113. See 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 13:2, at 399–400.  The Field Code 
merged law and equity into one code in 1848. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law:  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 932, 939 (1987).  The Field Code is the predecessor of about half the 
states’ modern day procedural codes. See id. 
 114. See 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 13:2, at 400. 
 115. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 23. 
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23 differs from the current federal Rule 23, the substance of Alaska’s 
certification procedure mirrors federal certification procedure.116 
C.  Due Process Rights of Rule 23 Absent Members:  Notice and the 
Opportunity To Be Heard 
This section discusses the due process rights of absent members.  Class 
counsel often invoke these rights when arguing that courts should not 
impose sanctions on nonresponsive members.117  The due process clause 
provides that the government shall not deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.118  The due process clause guarantees 
notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to a deprivation of life, liberty, 
or property.119  Pursuant to the guarantee of the opportunity to be heard, all 
Rule 23 absent members are entitled to adequate representation.120  
However, an absentee’s right to notice varies according to the type of class 
action.121  In mandatory class actions, notice of any class certification 
decision is not required;122 in opt-out class actions, notice of any class 
certification decision is mandatory.123 
Class actions are an exception to the general rule that one cannot be 
bound by a judgment in a litigation to which one is not a party.124  Because 
absent members do not actively participate in a class action, procedural 
mechanisms must ensure that the members’ interests are protected.125  The 
procedural mechanism of adequate representation ensures that absent 
members are bound by a judgment only where the named plaintiff 
adequately represents the class.126  Consequently, the class representative 
must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”127  To fulfill 
this requirement, the class representative must not have interests that are 
incompatible with the interests of the absent members.128 
Additionally, the plaintiffs’ attorney must be experienced and qualified to 
represent the absent members.129  Rule 23(g) builds on the adequate 
 
 116. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; ALASKA R. CIV. P. 23; see also SECTION OF LITIG., AM. BAR 
ASS’N, SURVEY OF STATE CLASS ACTION LAW 2012 ALASKA 21 (2012). 
 117. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 118. U.S. CONST. amend. V (provides for due process protections against the federal 
government); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (provides for due process protections against 
state and local governments). 
 119. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
 120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 121. See supra notes 47, 58, 71 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra notes 47, 58 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 124. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40–41 (1940). 
 125. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:1, at 2–3. 
 126. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42–43. 
 127. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 128. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 129. See id. 
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representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4).130  Under Rule 23(g), added in 
2003,131 the court appoints class counsel after considering counsel’s 
experience, knowledge of the law, resources, and work already done on the 
particular claims.132  Rule 23(g) was enacted because class counsel is “often 
critically important to the successful handling of a class action.”133 
In addition to the adequate representation requirement, absent members 
in (b)(3) class actions are protected by notice.134  In (b)(1) and (b)(2) 
mandatory class actions, notice of a class certification decision is 
discretionary.135  Because (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes are “homogeneous 
without any conflicting interests between the members of the class,” a 
binding judgment is not unfair (provided that the absent members have been 
adequately represented).136  The certification requirements of mandatory 
class actions make it less likely that there will be defenses or issues 
pertaining to individual members.137 
By contrast, notice is an essential part of the (b)(3) class action 
mechanism.138  Because (b)(3) actions do not have as much class cohesion 
as (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions, notice is an additional procedural safeguard that 
protects the interests of (b)(3) members.139  The notice must describe the 
action and the member’s rights in the action.140  Additionally, the notice 
must provide the member with an opportunity to be excluded from the class 
 
 130. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee’s note (2003 Amendment). 
 131. Id. 
 132. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(i); cf. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (2006) (requiring that the court appoint as lead plaintiff the member 
who is most capable of adequately representing the absent members’ interests and requiring 
the lead plaintiff to “select and retain counsel to represent the class”). 
 133. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee’s note (2003 Amendment). 
 134. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 47, 58 and accompanying text.  However, reasonable notice is 
required in all Rule 23 class actions of any proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, 
compromise, or claim for attorney’s fees. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1), 23(h)(1).  Accordingly, 
members of mandatory classes can protect their rights by objecting to a proposed resolution. 
See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class 
Action Litigation:  Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1536 (2004). 
 136. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir. 1975); accord Durrett v. 
John Deere Co., 150 F.R.D. 555, 562–63 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (discussing the procedural due 
process requirements of (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, as compared to (b)(3) class actions). 
 137. 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1786, at 496. 
 138. Id. at 492. 
 139. See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs’ Due 
Process:  Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871, 912–13 (1995) 
(citing Durrett, 150 F.R.D. at 562); cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 
2558–59 (2011) (explaining that in (b)(2) class actions, unlike in (b)(3) class actions, relief 
necessarily affects the entire class; therefore, notice is not mandatory). 
 140. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985).  The notice must 
comply with the Mullane guidelines for notice:  it must be the best practicable, reasonably 
calculated to inform the members of their rights, and offer the members an opportunity to 
object. See id. at 812. 
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and the opportunity to participate in the suit in person or through 
counsel.141 
D.  Postcertification Discovery of Absent Members:  Rule 23 Class Actions, 
FLSA Collective Actions, and State Class Actions 
This section discusses when and how absent members may be subject to 
discovery in Rule 23 class actions, FLSA collective actions, and California 
and Alaska state class actions.  Courts are in disagreement as to whether, 
and to what extent, Rule 23 absentees should be subject to postcertification 
discovery.142  The FRCP does not address the duties of absent class 
members.143  Rule 23(d) states that courts may make orders that are 
required to efficiently run a proceeding and protect absent members, but 
does not contemplate orders directed to absent members.144  Therefore, 
courts disagree as to whether absentees can be required to respond to 
discovery requests.145  Courts have considered this potential duty in light of 
the facts and goals of the particular litigation.146  A majority of the courts 
that have reached the issue have concluded that discovery of absentee 
members is permissible under certain circumstances.147  However, some 
courts have also noted that such discovery should not be allowed as a 
routine matter, because it is contrary to the general policy that absent 
members need not participate in a class action.148 
Courts have considered allowing discovery of absent members in all 
three kinds of Rule 23(b) class actions, FLSA collective actions, and state 
class actions.149  However, many of the cases analyzing whether such 
 
 141. See id.; supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 142. Postcertification discovery is discovery relating to the merits of the class members’ 
claim(s) or the defendant’s defense(s). See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 
F.2d 999, 1004–05 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that discovery of absent members is permissible 
if justice requires it and the court takes precautionary measures to protect the absent 
members); see also 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1796.1, at 56–57 (noting that the 
majority of courts have allowed discovery, at least under some circumstances). But see 
Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 
55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971) (holding that discovery of absent members is not 
permissible). 
 143. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 144. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d); Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Absent Class Members in 
Class Action Under Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure As Subject to Discovery, 13 
A.L.R. FED. 255, § 2[a], at 257 (1972). 
 145. See 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 16:1, at 120. 
 146. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 147. See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (surveying absentee 
member discovery cases and concluding that most courts do not categorically reject 
discovery of absent members); see also 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1796.1, at 56–57 
(noting that the majority of courts have allowed discovery of absent members). 
 148. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004–05 (7th Cir. 
1971); M. Berenson Co. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 635, 637 (D. Mass. 
1984) (citing Dellums, 566 F.2d at 187). 
 149. See infra Part II. 
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discovery is permissible are Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.150  Discovery may 
be more useful to defendants in (b)(3) class actions than in mandatory class 
actions, because the class is less cohesive.151  Additionally, ordering absent 
members to respond to discovery in mandatory Rule 23 class actions may 
be more coercive, because those members cannot opt out of the action.152  
Courts have considered allowing absentee discovery in many causes of 
action, including securities fraud,153 actions for unpaid wages,154 
employment discrimination,155 housing discrimination,156 and antitrust 
suits.157 
Diligent research has failed to uncover any instances in which courts 
have considered allowing discovery in Rule 23 negative value class 
actions.158  Likely, defendants have not requested such discovery because 
the cost of the discovery would exceed any benefit that the defendant could 
obtain from the information.159 
When deciding whether to permit absent member discovery, courts 
consider whether the requested discovery is appropriate in that particular 
litigation, the defendant’s need for the information, and the potential burden 
on the absent members.160  Courts have granted discovery when the 
information relates to common issues, the requests are not unduly 
burdensome, and the requested information is unavailable from the 
 
 150. See, e.g., Brennan, 450 F.2d at 1001 (noting that the class members could choose to 
be excluded from the class); Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC, 
2009 WL 1458032, at *7–11 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (holding that the class action 
satisfied the Rule 23(b)(3) requirements of predominance and superiority). 
 151. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 67 F.R.D. 691, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(permitting discovery of (b)(1) absentees, but noting a conflict of interest between the 
passive absent members and the information-seeking defendant); see also United States v. 
Trucking Emp’rs., Inc., 72 F.R.D. 101, 104 (D.D.C. 1976) (allowing discovery of absent 
members in a defendant class, but noting that such discovery might be coercive because 
defendant absentees do not have the opportunity to opt out of the class). 
 153. See, e.g., Arleth v. FMP Operating Co., Civ.A. No. 90-1663, 1991 WL 211521, at 
*5–6 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 1991) (securities fraud class action). 
 154. See, e.g., Cruz, 2011 WL 843956, at *5–8 (employment class action seeking 
overtime pay). 
 155. See, e.g., Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1555–57 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(sex discrimination action seeking injunctive and monetary relief). 
 156. See, e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974).  The court 
held that the party seeking discovery has the burden of showing that the discovery is proper. 
Id. at 340.  However, in the racial housing discrimination case at issue, the defendant did not 
prove that absent member discovery was necessary. See id. at 340–41. 
 157. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972) 
(declining to dismiss nonresponsive absent members in an antitrust case alleging price fixing 
of school milk). 
 158. See, e.g., 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 16:3, at 133–43 (providing 
examples of cases where courts considered the permissibility of absent member discovery). 
 159. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 160. 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1796.1, at 56–59. 
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representative parties.161  Because only common questions are 
appropriately resolved in a class action, courts have routinely rejected 
postcertification discovery requests where they pertain solely to individual 
issues.162  Courts have also rejected discovery requests where it is evident 
that the discovery requests are being used as a tactic to scare class members 
or to decrease the size of the class.163  Additionally, courts have expressed 
concern about discovery requests that are overly complicated or 
technical.164 
Absent members argue that they have an interest in not actively 
participating in a class action,165 not being unduly burdened by 
discovery,166 and maintaining the efficiency of class actions.167  Absentees 
argue that a defendant may use discovery as a tactic to harass absent 
members.168  Such discovery may discourage a member from remaining in 
the class, or force a member to hire individual counsel to complete the 
request.169 
What is more, permitting absent member discovery undermines the 
efficiency and intent of Rule 23 class actions by, in effect, creating an opt-
in procedure.170  Rule 23 is an opt-out scheme which includes all class 
 
 161. Transamerican Ref. Corp. v. Dravo Corp., 139 F.R.D. 619, 621 (S.D. Tex. 1991) 
(citing Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Trucking 
Emp’rs., Inc., 72 F.R.D. 101, 104 (D.D.C. 1976)). 
 162. See Redmond v. Moody’s Investor Serv., 92 CIV. 9161 (WK), 1995 WL 276150, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1995) (citing Enter. Wall Paper Mfg. Co. v. Bodman, 85 F.R.D. 325, 
327 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 67 F.R.D. 691, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975)). 
 163. See, e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 340 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(reversing an order dismissing nonresponsive members because the defendant never proved 
that the discovery was not a scare tactic); see also Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 
532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (noting that one of the absent members wrote to the court 
requesting exclusion from the class because the discovery requests were intimidating). 
 164. See, e.g., Collins v. Int’l Dairy Queen, 190 F.R.D. 629, 632–33 (M.D. Ga. 1999) 
(denying discovery, in part because the interrogatories were so technical that the absent 
members would require the assistance of an accountant or an attorney); Kline v. First W. 
Gov’t Sec., Inc., No. CIV.A. 83-1076, 1996 WL 122717, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1996) 
(noting that the requested interrogatories were complicated, weighing in favor of denying the 
discovery request). 
 165. See Redmond, 1995 WL 276150, at *1 (citing Robertson, 67 F.R.D. at 699). 
 166. See Dellums, 566 F.2d at 187 (citing Clark, 501 F.2d at 340–41). 
 167. See Wainwright, 54 F.R.D. at 534 (“The usefulness of Rule 23 would end if class 
members could be subjected to Rule 33 and forced to spend time, and perhaps engage legal 
counsel, to answer detailed interrogatories.”). 
 168. See Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding 
that the interrogatories were propounded as a tactic to reduce class size); 5 CONTE & 
NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 16:3, at 138–39. 
 169. See Wainwright, 54 F.R.D. at 534; John J. Madden & Denise G. Paully, Making the 
Class Determination in Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 807 (1974); 
cf. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1971) (noting 
that class counsel encouraged the absentees to seek help from either their personal lawyer or 
class counsel when answering the interrogatories). 
 170. Compare Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 313, 319 (D. Colo. 
1999) (holding that the proposed questionnaire must be optional, because a mandatory 
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members unless they request exclusion.171  Such a procedure helps to 
resolve disputes efficiently by resolving as many claims as possible in one 
litigation.172  By ordering discovery, courts force members to affirmatively 
participate in, or opt into, the action.173  Plaintiffs argue that this effectively 
transforms a class action into a “massive joinder” of many individual 
claims.174 
Defendants argue that they have an interest in obtaining information that 
may be necessary to prove a defense.175  Defendants may seek discovery 
from absent members to obtain information to support an affirmative 
defense,176 to prove that there is no claim,177 or to prove that a class lacks 
interest in proceeding as a whole.178  Additionally, absent member 
discovery may illuminate the scope of the litigation and provide 
information for negotiating a settlement.179 
Ironically, discovery of absent members may undermine the efficiency of 
Rule 23 in a way that disadvantages not only absent members, but also 
defendants.  If a court orders discovery and some members do not respond, 
the court might dismiss the nonresponsive members.180  If those 
nonresponsive members are excluded from the action but can later sue the 
defendant on the same claim, the defendant may be subject to repetitive 
individual litigation if it cannot reach settlements with those individual 
 
questionnaire would create an opt-in scheme running contrary to Rule 23), with Cruz v. 
Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC, 2011 WL 843956, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 8, 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that mandatory discovery creates an opt-in 
scheme). 
 171. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Wainwright, 54 F.R.D. at 534. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Redmond v. Moody’s Investor Serv., 92 CIV. 9161 (WK), 1995 WL 276150, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1995) (citing Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 67 F.R.D. 691, 699 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975)).  However, class counsel may also have an interest in obtaining the 
information, as it can be helpful in assessing the strength of the class’s case. See Schwartz, 
185 F.R.D. at 320 (noting that the questionnaire would assist both the defendant and class 
counsel in discovery proceedings). 
 176. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1971) 
(seeking discovery to prove a lack of liability). 
 177. See, e.g., Barham v. Ramsey, 246 F.R.D. 60, 63 (D.D.C. 2007) (seeking evidence 
that would tend to disprove a constitutional violation by police during a mass arrest); 
Schwartz, 185 F.R.D. at 315 (seeking evidence to disprove plaintiffs’ reliance claims). 
 178. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 
1552 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that the trial court dismissed the employment class action after 
many members failed to respond to discovery, because there was not sufficient numerosity). 
But see Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 15 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (denying discovery because “the 
delineation of appropriate classes is a question of law”). 
 179. See Madden & Paully, supra note 169, at 807.  Such information may also be of 
benefit to class counsel. See Schwartz, 185 F.R.D. at 320. 
 180. See infra Part II.A. 
 2013] LET THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME 2031 
members.181  In sum, absent member discovery could lead to a defendant 
being unable to obtain a “bill of peace.”182 
Two Rule 23 cases, one permitting absentee discovery and the other 
denying it, illustrate how courts have grappled with the defendant’s need 
for information and the absentees’ interest in not being burdened.  In 
Dellums v. Powell,183 demonstrators who had been arrested while protesting 
the Vietnam War brought a Rule 23(b)(3) class action against the chief of 
the capitol police, claiming false arrest, false imprisonment, and Fourth 
Amendment violations.184  At trial, absent members gave testimony that 
established that policemen beat the demonstrators while arresting them.185  
On appeal, Powell, the chief of police, argued that the testimony was 
improperly admitted because the FRCP did not permit discovery of absent 
members.186  The D.C. Circuit surveyed case law pertaining to absentee 
discovery.187  The court held that such discovery is permissible where the 
requests are related to common questions, are made in good faith and not 
unduly burdensome, and where the requested information is not available 
from the representatives themselves.188  Further, the court noted that Powell 
had the names of all the class members and could readily serve discovery 
requests on the members.189  Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision to admit the absent member testimony.190 
By contrast, in Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp.,191 a district court found that 
discovery of absent members is categorically impermissible.192  In 
Wainwright, Georgia school boards brought a class action against milk 
companies, alleging that the milk companies fixed prices in violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.193  The milk companies served interrogatories and 
document production requests on the school boards and then moved to 
compel the school boards to answer.194  The district court denied the milk 
companies’ motion and held that they would not be permitted to take 
discovery of the absent members.195  The court reasoned that forcing the 
absentees to respond would undermine the efficiency of Rule 23, essentially 
making the class action a “massive joinder.”196  Further, the court held that 
 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 16 and 17. 
 182. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 183. 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 184. See id. at 173–75. 
 185. See id. at 187.  The testimony was intended to establish bad faith and malice on the 
part of the police. See id. at 188. 
 186. See id. at 187. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972). 
 192. See id. at 534. 
 193. See id. at 533. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. at 535. 
 196. See id. at 534. 
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absent members are not parties under Rule 23 and, therefore, are not subject 
to party discovery rules.197 
Among the courts that have permitted discovery in Rule 23 class actions, 
there has been a split on the issue of which party should bear the cost.198  
Some courts have ordered the defendant to pay,199 likely reasoning that the 
defendant requested the discovery and therefore should bear the costs.  One 
court has ordered the defendant and plaintiffs’ counsel to split costs, 
reasoning that the discovery benefitted both the plaintiff’s case and the 
defendant’s case.200 
While there has been dispute about whether to allow discovery of Rule 
23 absentees, courts have generally agreed that discovery of FLSA 
collective action plaintiffs is permissible.201  Unlike in Rule 23 class 
actions, FLSA plaintiffs have chosen to opt into the action;202 accordingly, 
subjecting those plaintiffs to discovery raises fewer concerns of coercion.  
Additionally, the discovery phase is a crucial component in the second step 
of the two-step process, because it allows the court to assess whether the 
members are similarly situated with a higher level of scrutiny.203 
Similarly to courts considering Rule 23 absent member discovery, state 
courts also disagree on whether absent members can be subject to discovery 
in state class actions.204  California state courts are the only state courts that 
have considered in multiple cases whether absentees should be subject to 
discovery.205  In California state class actions, defendants are sometimes 
permitted to take discovery of absent members, but such discovery is not 
permitted as a matter of course.206  Case law indicates that defendants in a 
California state class action have a due process right to discovery from 
 
 197. See id. (explaining that absent members cannot be parties, because absent members 
have the option of intervening or formally entering the class action).  However, after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Devlin, it is clear that absent members can be parties.  In that 
case, the Supreme Court held that an absent member can be a party for some purposes, 
depending on the procedural context of the litigation. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 
9–10 (2002). 
 198. See Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 313, 319 (D. Colo. 1999) 
(noting that some courts have held that the party seeking to serve a questionnaire must bear 
the costs of the questionnaire). 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. at 319–20; cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) 
(holding that the petitioner must bear the cost of notice to class members). 
 201. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 202. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
 203. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
 204. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(f) (“Unnamed members of a class action are not to be 
considered as parties for purposes of discovery.”). But see Spoon v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. 
Rptr. 44, 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (permitting absent member discovery). 
 205. See Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Absent or Unnamed Class Members in Class Action 
in State Court As Subject to Discovery, 28 A.L.R. 4TH 986, § 1, at 987–93 (1984) (discussing 
five California state court cases and one Louisiana state court case addressing the 
permissibility of absent member discovery). 
 206. See Spoon, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 47. 
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absent members.207  Therefore, absent members are not automatically 
immune from discovery requests.208  However, California state courts find 
that discovery restrictions are necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the 
class action.209  Accordingly, the defendant must prove that the 
interrogatories concern matters that are necessary to the trial of class issues, 
are not unduly burdensome on absentees, and will not foreseeably decrease 
the class size.210 
Alaska state courts have not yet ruled on whether and to what extent 
absentees in Alaska state class actions are subject to discovery.211  In 
International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v. Bissonette,212 the Alaska Supreme 
Court surveyed federal case law regarding the permissibility of absent 
member discovery.213  However, the Alaska Supreme Court did not endorse 
or reject absent member discovery.214 
E.  Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions and State Discovery Sanctions 
Courts draw on their federal or state sanction powers when imposing 
sanctions on nonresponsive absent members.215  Accordingly, Part I.E 
explores federal discovery sanctions as well as California and Alaska state 
discovery sanctions.  This section discusses the purpose of such sanctions 
and the different kinds of permitted sanctions.  Next, it considers the 
standards by which courts analyze whether, and which, sanctions are 
warranted. 
Under the authority of Rule 37, federal courts can impose sanctions on 
parties for failure to comply with discovery orders.216  Federal courts use 
their Rule 37 authority to impose sanctions on absent members in Rule 23 
class actions and FLSA collective actions when those members fail to 
respond to discovery.217  Rule 37 discovery sanctions serve several 
 
 207. See id. at 51. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See Danzig v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. Rptr. 185, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (citing 
Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62 F.R.D. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1973)) (explaining that the purpose of 
class actions is to eliminate repetitive litigation and alleviate the participation burden on 
absent class members). 
 210. See id. at 191. 
 211. See Appellees’ Brief at 42, Int’l Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v. Bissonette, 146 P.3d 561 
(Alaska 2006) (No. S-11568), 2005 WL 3125938. 
 212. 146 P.3d 561 (Alaska 2006). 
 213. See id. at 568–69.  The Alaska Supreme Court’s approach to absent member 
discovery sanctions will be discussed in Part II.B.1. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See infra Part II. 
 216. FED. R. CIV. P. 37.  Rule 37 is not the exclusive authority for discovery sanctions.  
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, any person who unreasonably delays court proceedings can be 
required to pay costs and attorney’s fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).  Additionally, courts 
possess common law sanction powers. See Olivieri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (discussing courts’ inherent powers to “supervise and control” court proceedings). 
 217. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 09-60073, 2011 WL 2729076, at 
*4–7 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2011) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice 
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purposes: they are a specific deterrent to the noncompliant party, a general 
deterrent to others, and ensure that the noncompliant party will not benefit 
from his or her failure to respond.218  However, courts must also take care 
to ensure that a sanction is warranted, particularly when imposing the 
harshest litigation-ending sanctions.219  Litigation-ending sanctions are 
disfavored because they preclude resolution on the merits, thereby raising 
due process concerns.220  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a 
sanction must be fair and must be related to the claim that is at issue in the 
discovery order.221  When deciding whether a sanction is fair, a court 
analyzes a noncompliant party’s culpability and course of behavior in the 
particular case.222 
Given the fact-specific nature of sanction imposition, there is no rigid test 
that dictates whether or which sanctions should be imposed.223  Rather, 
courts are free to consider a number of factors.224  Courts have considered, 
among other factors, the willfulness and bad faith of the party in not 
complying with the order,225 the prejudice to the opposing party,226 whether 
lesser sanctions would be effective,227 whether the noncompliant party was 
warned of the sanction,228 and the policy favoring disposing of cases on the 
merits.229 
Under Rule 37(b), federal courts may impose the following sanctions, in 
ascending order of severity, for failure to comply with court ordered 
discovery:  direct that facts related to matters in the discovery order be 
taken as established for the purposes of the action; prohibit the 
noncompliant party from presenting certain claims, defenses, or evidence; 
 
nonresponsive FLSA party plaintiffs under Rule 37(b)); Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 
Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC, 2011 WL 843956, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011) (granting 
defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice nonresponsive Rule 23 class members 
under Rule 37(b)). 
 218. See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) 
(noting that sanctions can serve as both a specific deterrent and a general deterrent); Update 
Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 219. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. 
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209–10 (1958). 
 220. See id. (noting that dismissal without a hearing of the merits implicates Fifth 
Amendment due process problems). 
 221. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 707 
(1982). 
 222. See id. at 707–08 (analyzing the noncompliant party’s behavior and concluding that 
the trial court’s sanction—deeming jurisdictional facts established—was just). 
 223. See Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 224. See Joel Slawotsky, Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions—The Need for Supreme Court 
Ordered Uniformity, 104 DICK. L. REV. 471, 500–01 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court 
has not offered guidance on which factors courts should consider when imposing sanctions, 
and suggesting that courts analyze eight factors in a balancing test). 
 225. See Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 226. See id. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921. 
 229. See id. 
 2013] LET THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME 2035 
strike pleadings; stay proceedings until the discovery order is completed; 
dismiss the action; render a default judgment; or hold a party in contempt of 
court.230  In addition to or instead of these sanctions, courts can order the 
noncompliant party and/or the attorney representing the noncompliant party 
to pay expenses caused by the noncompliance, unless such an award would 
be unjust.231  An award of expenses may be unjust if other severe sanctions 
have already been imposed.232  Under Rule 37(d), a court can impose Rule 
37(b) sanctions and/or expenses when a party fails to attend its own 
deposition or answer interrogatories.233 
The Supreme Court has held that courts should not dismiss with 
prejudice when a party is unable to comply due to external factors.234  
However, dismissal may be warranted if a party has not complied due to 
willfulness, bad faith, or fault.235  The Supreme Court has explained that 
when a party makes a good-faith effort to comply with discovery, due 
process concerns weigh against dismissing the action.236 
When dismissing a claim, a court can either dismiss the claim with 
prejudice or without prejudice.237  Dismissal with prejudice extinguishes 
the party’s claim forever;238 on the other hand, dismissal without prejudice 
ends only the present litigation.239  A party dismissed without prejudice 
may refile the same suit on the same claim.240 
 
 230. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)–(E). 
 231. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(E).  Costs can be awarded for, among other things, 
attorney’s fees for the cost of preparing or prosecuting a motion for sanctions. See, e.g., 
Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 29, 33 (D. Me. 1994) (awarding the fees and costs 
associated with bringing a motion for compliance and a motion for sanctions). 
 232. See Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Sanctions Available Under Rule 37, Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Other Than Exclusion of Expert Testimony, for Failure To Obey 
Discovery Order Not Related to Expert Witness, 156 A.L.R. FED. 601, § 10[b], at 692 
(1999). 
 233. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(1)(A), 37(d)(3). 
 234. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. 
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958). 
 235. See id. (holding that the district court erred in dismissing a Swiss holding company 
with prejudice for its failure to produce bank documents, because the holding company could 
not produce bank documents due to a conflict of laws). 
 236. See id. at 209 (“[T]here are constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even 
in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause.”). 
 237. See Sharif v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 376 F.3d 720, 725 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(comparing judicially created notice requirements for dismissal with prejudice and dismissal 
without prejudice). 
 238. See Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Meade v. 
Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1520 n.6 (10th Cir. 1988)). 
 239. See Sharif, 376 F.3d at 725. 
 240. See id. (noting that where there are statute of limitations problems, dismissal without 
prejudice may have the same effect as dismissal without prejudice). 
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A court can also exclude a noncompliant party from presenting evidence 
in support of a particular claim or defense.241  This sanction is especially 
appropriate when the noncompliant party frustrated discovery or when the 
evidence obtained from discovery would be necessary to build a claim.242  
Most courts have excluded evidence only when the noncompliant party has 
acted in bad faith, or when the failure causes incurable prejudice because of 
the due process concerns raised by the lack of evidence.243 
Both California and Alaska state rules set forth discovery sanctions that 
mirror the discovery sanctions set forth in Rule 37.  Under Alaska’s Rule 
37(b), a court can, among other sanctions, direct that facts be taken as 
established for the purposes of the litigation, prohibit a party from 
introducing evidence, strike out pleadings, or treat a party in contempt of 
court.244  Similar to federal court powers, Alaska state courts can order the 
noncompliant party to pay costs and fees, unless the failure was justified or 
such an award would be unjust.245  California’s Code of Civil Procedure 
authorizes courts to impose discovery sanctions under five categories:  
monetary sanctions, issue sanctions, evidence sanctions, terminating 
sanctions, and contempt sanctions.246 
II.  HARSH PUNISHMENT OR FAIR GAME?  
SANCTIONING NONRESPONSIVE ABSENTEES 
Part II discusses the decisions of courts that have considered whether, 
and how, to sanction absent members for failure to respond to 
postcertification discovery requests.  First, this part explores the decisions 
of courts that have dismissed noncompliant members with prejudice and 
courts that have dismissed noncompliant members without prejudice.  Next, 
it considers the reasoning of courts that have refused to dismiss 
noncompliant members.  Finally, this part discusses the decisions of courts 
that have imposed lesser sanctions:  exclusion of evidence, exclusion of 
new claims, and monetary sanctions. 
Few courts have considered whether to impose discovery sanctions on 
absentees.247  Accordingly, this section discusses the handful of leading 
cases on the issue.  Most courts agree that only willful or bad faith 
misconduct on the part of absentees warrants imposing sanctions at all.248  
 
 241. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(B); Callwood v. Zurita, 158 F.R.D. 359, 362 (D.V.I. 
1994) (prohibiting the defendant Attorney General, who violated four discovery orders, from 
presenting evidence to disprove the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint). 
 242. See Slawotsky, supra note 224, at 484. 
 243. See id. 
 244. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 37(b), 37(d). 
 245. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(E). 
 246. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023.030 (West 2007). 
 247. Rydstrom, supra note 144, at 257. 
 248. See, e.g., Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that dismissal for violation of discovery orders should be considered only if the 
nonresponsive members acted in bad faith); Hernandez v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 09-
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Many courts have found that ignoring repeated requests for discovery 
constitutes bad faith misconduct.249 
A.  Dismissal 
Part II.A details the decisions of courts that have dismissed absent 
members for failure to respond to discovery requests.  First, this section 
discusses the decisions of courts that have dismissed nonresponsive 
members with prejudice.  Second, it discusses the decisions of courts that 
have dismissed nonresponsive members without prejudice.  Finally, Part 
II.A explores the decisions of courts that have declined to dismiss 
nonresponsive members. 
1.  Extinguishing Absent Member Claims Forever:  
Dismissal with Prejudice 
Courts rarely invoke dismissal with prejudice.  There are three leading 
cases in which courts have done so.250  Out of those three cases, only one 
case is an opt-out class action; the other two cases are opt-in class 
actions.251  Because opt-in absent members have affirmatively opted into 
the class, and thus are more like real parties, a failure to respond shows 
greater bad faith in opt-in class actions than it does in opt-out class 
actions.252 
The cases that order dismissal with prejudice reflect bad-faith misconduct 
on the part of the absent members.253  In Brennan v. Midwestern United 
Life Insurance Co.254 and Hernandez v. Starbucks Coffee Co.,255 the 
noncompliant members each received three warnings before the court 
contemplated dismissal.256  In Estrada v. RPS, Inc.,257 the absent members 
 
60073, 2011 WL 2729076, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2011) (assessing whether the absentees 
acted in bad faith when ignoring three court orders); Arleth v. FMP Operating Co., Civ.A. 
No. 90-1663, 1991 WL 211521, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 1991) (denying dismissal of the 
nonresponsive members, in part because the members did not act in bad faith). 
 249. See, e.g., Hernandez, 2011 WL 2729076, at *7 n.7 (finding that failure to comply 
with three court orders is evidence of willfulness and bad faith); Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, 
Inc., Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC, 2011 WL 843956, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011) 
(noting that ignoring discovery requests and warnings is evidence of willfulness, bad faith, 
and fault). 
 250. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971); 
Hernandez, 2011 WL 2729076; Estrada v. RPS, Inc., No. BC210130, 2003 WL 25715846 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003), appeal dismissed, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 267–68 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
 251. See infra notes 259–90 and accompanying text. 
 252. See infra notes 278, 288 and accompanying text. 
 253. See infra notes 262, 276, 288 and accompanying text. 
 254. 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971). 
 255. No. 09-60073, 2011 WL 2729076 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2011). 
 256. See infra notes 262, 273 and accompanying text. 
 257. No. BC210130, 2003 WL 25715846 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003). 
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acted in bad faith by refusing to respond to a questionnaire after they had 
already been in contact with class counsel.258 
In Brennan, the Seventh Circuit dismissed absent members with 
prejudice from a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out securities fraud class action.259  The 
plaintiffs alleged that Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. committed 
securities fraud by aiding and abetting a securities dealer who never 
delivered the stock that the plaintiffs purchased.260  The trial court had 
permitted the defendant to serve interrogatories on the absentees for two 
purposes:  to determine the amount of each member’s claim and to obtain 
information to prove that it was not liable.261  Many members failed to 
respond, even after class counsel sent a reminder letter and two warning 
letters to the nonresponsive members.262  Consequently, upon the 
defendant’s motion, the district court dismissed the nonresponsive 
absentees with prejudice.263  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, 
reasoning that dismissal with prejudice was a permissible sanction because 
it compels response.264  However, the court recognized that dismissal of 
absent members is a “drastic” sanction; the members took no affirmative 
action and were represented by the named plaintiff, but their claims would 
be extinguished forever.265  Yet the Seventh Circuit found that dismissal 
with prejudice was warranted because the noncompliant members ignored 
multiple warnings.266 
Two courts have dismissed absent members with prejudice in opt-in class 
actions.267  In Hernandez, a district court held that nonresponsive members 
in a FLSA action can be dismissed with prejudice, but only after the 
members have been warned that noncompliance could result in dismissal.268  
The plaintiffs argued that the class members were improperly classified as 
store managers who were exempt from overtime pay.269  After certification, 
the defendant served three interrogatories and four document requests on 
the absent members.270  The requests sought information relating to the 
employees’ resumes and job applications after working at Starbucks, as 
 
 258. See infra note 287 and accompanying text. 
 259. See Brennan, 450 F.2d at 1001, 1006. 
 260. See id. at 1001. 
 261. See id. at 1005. 
 262. See id. at 1002. 
 263. See id. 
 264. See id. at 1004–05. 
 265. See id. at 1003–04; see also id. at 1004 n.2 (noting that, while exclusion from the 
class may be an appropriate remedy in many cases, the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion by dismissing the members in this case). 
 266. See id. at 1004 n.2. 
 267. See infra notes 268–90 and accompanying text. 
 268. See Hernandez v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 09-60073, 2011 WL 2729076, at *6 
(S.D. Fla. June 22, 2011). 
 269. See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Reed v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 09-
60073 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2009), 2009 WL 3488645. 
 270. See Hernandez, 2011 WL 2729076, at *1. 
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well as any previous testimony about working for Starbucks.271  Starbucks 
sought to use the evidence at trial and in support of its motion to decertify 
the class.272  Out of 732 members, 376 members failed to respond for 
nearly a year despite three orders requesting a response.273  The court 
decided to give the nonresponsive members a final written warning, but 
planned to dismiss the members with prejudice if they still failed to 
respond.274 
Like the Brennan court, the Hernandez court was influenced by the fact 
that the absent members refused to respond to three warnings.275  The court 
found that the noncompliant members acted in willful bad faith when they 
failed to respond to the three court orders.276  However, the Hernandez 
court distinguished opt-in FLSA actions from opt-out actions.277  The court 
explained that the defendant is presumed to be prejudiced when opt-in 
absentees fail to respond to class wide discovery.278  The court’s finding of 
prejudice supported the court’s finding that the members acted willfully and 
in bad faith.279 
In Estrada, pick-up and delivery drivers sought damages for unpaid labor 
expenses in a California state class action.280  The plaintiffs claimed that 
they were improperly classified as independent contractors, and thus were 
entitled to repayment of expenses incurred during their work.281  
Functionally, Estrada was an opt-in class action because the absent 
members had to respond to a conditional certification questionnaire to be 
considered for inclusion in the class action.282  After defining the class, the 
court ordered that another questionnaire be sent to the absent members.283  
The second questionnaire was intended to gather evidence relating to 
damages and the issue of whether the plaintiffs were employees or 
independent contractors.284  Ultimately, the court dismissed with prejudice 
the members who did not respond to the second questionnaire.285 
 
 271. See id. at *2.  Starbucks requested information about the employees’ subsequent job 
applications because it sought information about how the employees described their job 
duties. 
 272. See id. at *1–2. 
 273. See id. at *2. 
 274. See id. at *6. 
 275. See supra notes 262–64, 273 and accompanying text. 
 276. See Hernandez, 2011 WL 2729076, at *6. 
 277. See id. at *5. 
 278. See id. (citing Colozzi v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. Ctr., No. 5:08-CV-1220 (DNH/DEP), 
2010 WL 3433997, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 20, 2010)). 
 279. See id. at *5–6. 
 280. See Estrada v. RPS, Inc., No. BC210130, 2003 WL 25715846 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 
17, 2003), appeal dismissed, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 267–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 281. See id. 
 282. See id.  The first questionnaire was intended to ascertain whether the potential 
members fit the class definition. See id. 
 283. See id. 
 284. See id. 
 285. See id. 
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Like the Brennan court and the Hernandez court, the Estrada court was 
influenced by the members’ bad-faith refusal to respond.286  The Estrada 
members’ nonresponse was in bad faith because they had previously been 
in contact with class counsel when answering the conditional class 
certification questionnaire.287  Additionally, like the Hernandez court, the 
Estrada court explicitly found that the members’ willful refusal to respond 
prejudiced the defendant employer.288  The defendant was prejudiced 
because the requested information directly involved the issues of the 
case.289  Further, the members’ refusal to respond deprived the employer of 
its due process right to discovery under California law.290 
2.  Giving Absent Members a Break:  Dismissal Without Prejudice 
This subsection analyzes the two leading decisions in which courts have 
ordered dismissal of absentees without prejudice.  Both decisions reflect 
concern for the absent members’ due process rights.291  Showing concern 
for the noncompliant members’ right to be heard, the Cruz court allowed 
individual members to continue with their claims by ordering dismissal 
without prejudice and tolling the statute of limitations.292  The Cruz court 
ordered dismissal because the members acted in bad faith, there was 
prejudice to the defendant, and lesser sanctions would have been 
ineffective.293  In his Brennan dissent, then-Judge John Paul Stevens argued 
that the nonresponsive absentees should be dismissed as a matter of 
procedure, because their interests diverged from the interests of the 
representative when they failed to respond to the interrogatories.294  Thus, 
the nonresponsive members were not adequately represented, and the court 
lacked power to bind them in judgment.295 
In Cruz, a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out employment class action, the plaintiffs 
alleged that their employment status was improperly classified.296  As a 
result, defendant Dollar Tree Stores failed to pay overtime wages and 
provide rest and meal breaks.297  Dollar Tree Stores served document 
requests and interrogatories that were related to the class members’ work 
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 287. See Estrada, 2003 WL 25715846. 
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hours and job responsibilities.298  After many class members failed to 
respond, the class members were mailed two letters warning of case-
dispositive sanctions.299  Concerned with the right to be heard, the court 
dismissed the nonresponsive members without prejudice and tolled the 
statute of limitations as to those members.300  Further, the Cruz court 
declined to dismiss members whose final warning letters were returned as 
undeliverable.301  The court reasoned that dismissing these members would 
be unfair because they never had a final opportunity to respond.302 
The court used the Ninth Circuit’s five-part test to assess whether a case-
ending sanction was warranted and then surveyed case law pertaining to 
absent member dismissal.303  The court found that four of the five factors—
the public’s interest in resolution, the court’s need to manage its docket, 
prejudice to the defendant, and the effectiveness of lesser sanctions—
supported dismissal.304  The factor favoring the resolution of cases on the 
merits did not support dismissal.305 
Additionally, the Cruz court found that Brennan was persuasive authority 
in support of dismissal and that Wainwright was unpersuasive.306  
Following the reasoning of Brennan, the Cruz court found that Dollar Tree 
Stores did not use the interrogatories as a tactic to scare or confuse class 
members.307  Further, the court ameliorated the due process problems that 
concerned the Wainwright court by allowing members to continue 
individually with their claims.308 
The Cruz court found that Dollar Tree Stores would be prejudiced if the 
nonresponsive members’ claims were not dismissed.309  Without the 
discovery responses, it would be difficult for Dollar Tree Stores to identify 
which class members best supported its case.310  Accordingly, Dollar Tree 
Stores would be disadvantaged when determining which members to call as 
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adverse or rebuttal witnesses.311  Further, some of the outstanding discovery 
responses could potentially be useful to Dollar Tree Stores’ experts.312 
Additionally, lesser sanctions would be ineffective.313  Monetary 
sanctions would not ameliorate Dollar Tree Stores’ prejudice and would be 
impossible to collect from absentees.314  Claim preclusion of the discovery-
related claims would be tantamount to dismissal, because the requested 
discovery concerned all of the members’ claims.315 
Finally, the Cruz court found the absentees’ behavior to be in bad 
faith.316  The court noted that the Ninth Circuit has held that dismissal is 
justified only where the party’s behavior has shown “willfulness, bad faith, 
and fault.”317  The nonresponsive members had acted in bad faith because 
they had ignored multiple warning letters.318 
In his Brennan dissent, then-Judge Stevens focused on the court’s 
jurisdictional power to bind the absent members.319  He argued that 
nonresponsive members should be excluded from the class because of their 
right to adequate representation.320  Citing Hansberry v. Lee,321 Judge 
Stevens explained that a litigant can represent absent parties only to the 
extent that the litigant and the absent parties’ interests align.322  Judge 
Stevens reasoned that the nonresponding absent members had some interest 
in not revealing the information requested in the interrogatories and that this 
interest put them outside the class represented by the named plaintiff.323  He 
concluded that the nonresponsive members should have had a choice to 
request exclusion from the class as an alternative to responding to the 
interrogatories.324 
3.  Disadvantaging the Defendant:  Dismissal Is Not Warranted 
This subsection analyzes the reasoning of courts that have declined to 
dismiss absent members for failure to respond to discovery requests.  It first 
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examines whether sanctions lesser than dismissal can be appropriate and 
whether discovery requests coupled with a threat of dismissal can 
intimidate absent members.  Then, it examines the bad-faith requirement.  
Finally, it considers whether dismissal of absent members creates an opt-in 
scheme. 
Dismissal is one of the harshest sanctions because it is litigation 
ending.325  Consequently, plaintiffs argue that courts should impose lesser 
sanctions on noncompliant members, if lesser sanctions are available.326  In 
Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,327 a Rule 23(b)(2) employment sex 
discrimination action, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court’s 
decision dismissing members who did not respond to interrogatories.328  
The Cox court found that the trial judge did not consider lesser sanctions, 
and stated that there is an abuse of discretion if lesser sanctions would have 
sufficed.329 
Similarly, in Wouters v. Martin County330 an FLSA collective action 
brought by emergency medical service personnel to recover overtime pay, 
the Eleventh Circuit found that a lesser sanction was available and reversed 
the dismissal of noncompliant members.331  At the trial level, the defendant 
had requested the award of attorney’s fees to cover the cost of preparation 
for the motion to dismiss, but the trial court had dismissed the noncompliant 
plaintiffs instead.332  Because a lesser sanction was available, dismissal was 
inappropriate.333 
Courts have shown concern that the threat of a sanction as severe as 
dismissal can intimidate class members.334  A dismissal order can 
potentially reduce the class size and thereby undermine the Rule 23 policy 
that all members are included unless they request exclusion.335  In Easton & 
Co. v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co.,336 a securities fraud class action, 
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the district court expressed concern that members might be intimidated by 
an interrogatory request warning of potential dismissal sanctions.337  
Ultimately, the court permitted the defendant to serve discovery on the 
absentees.338  However, the court ordered the defendant to redraft the 
interrogatory request to eliminate a warning of dismissal.339  Similarly, in 
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass’n,340 a mandatory 23(b)(1) class 
action, the court stipulated that discovery would not be enforced with the 
threat of dismissal.341  The court explained that it had a duty to protect 
absentees from harassment.342 
The Eleventh Circuit has declined to dismiss absentees when there is no 
showing of bad faith on the part of the absentees.343  In both Cox and 
Wouters, the Eleventh Circuit held that dismissal requires a showing of 
willful bad faith.344  In Cox, the Eleventh Circuit refused to affirm the trial 
court’s dismissal order, because the trial court neglected to make a finding 
of bad faith.345  Similarly, in Wouters, the court reversed the dismissal of 
the noncompliant members because there was no finding of bad faith by the 
trial court.346 
Plaintiffs argue that dismissing noncompliant members in an opt-out 
action creates an opt-in action, which reduces efficiency and is inconsistent 
with the policies of Rule 23.347  As discussed in Part I, one of the purposes 
of Rule 23 is to enhance efficiency.348  By encompassing all members who 
did not request exclusion, opt-out class actions decrease the number of 
actions that will be brought on the same claim.349  Plaintiffs argue that 
requiring absent members to respond to discovery creates an opt-in action, 
because the members have to take an affirmative action to remain in the 
class.350  Requiring such affirmative action is contrary to the all-
encompassing rationale of Rule 23.351  Further, forcing plaintiffs to respond 
or be dismissed is contrary to the Supreme Court’s view of the passive role 
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of absent members.352  By forcing a member to choose between dismissal 
and response, that member is no longer “not required to do anything . . . .  
[but] sit back and allow the litigation to run its course.”353 
In Cox, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that dismissal of noncompliant 
absentees is contrary to the opt-out scheme of Rule 23.354  The Cox court 
noted that the Rule 23 advisory committee specifically rejected an opt-in 
approach.355  Further, requiring an affirmative action may intimidate 
members, effectively “freezing” out their claims.356  If absentees’ claims 
are frozen, it follows that total class action damages awards will decrease 
(assuming that the members do not continue their claims individually).357 
Courts have also considered whether dismissal creates an opt-in scheme 
when deciding whether to permit discovery in the first place.358  In Kline v. 
First Western Government Securities, Inc.,359 a securities fraud action, the 
court denied the defendant’s motion to serve discovery on absentees.360  
The court explained that serving discovery and then filing a motion to 
dismiss nonresponsive members was a “back door” way to create an opt-in 
action.361  By creating a choice between response or dismissal, such a 
scheme would force absentees to opt in or be excluded.362  On the other 
hand, in Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc.,363 a Rule 23(b)(3) securities 
class action, a district court permitted the defendant to serve discovery on 
absent members.364  However, the court found that a potential motion to 
dismiss would create an opt-in class action, and therefore decided to make 
the questionnaire optional.365 
B.  Considering Other Options:  Exclusion of Evidence, Estoppel of 
New Claims, and Monetary Sanctions 
Part II.B discusses the decisions of courts that have imposed sanctions 
lesser than dismissal on noncompliant absentees.  Diligent research has 
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shown that few courts have considered imposing sanctions other than 
dismissal on absentees.  Accordingly, this section discusses four leading 
cases in which courts considered imposing alternative sanctions.  This 
section analyzes a decision affirming the exclusion of evidence, a decision 
excluding new claims, and two decisions discussing monetary sanctions. 
1.  Exclusion of Evidence 
In International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc., the Alaska Supreme Court 
affirmed a trial court’s order excluding any evidence provided by 
nonresponsive members.366  In that case, a class of commercial salmon 
fishers alleged that the defendant fish buyer promised to pay a more 
competitive price on salmon than what it had actually paid.367  The fish 
buyer served two interrogatories on absentees to determine what documents 
or statements the class members relied on in believing that the defendant 
owed them a higher price per pound.368  When many members failed to 
respond, the fish buyer moved to dismiss the nonresponsive members 
without prejudice.369  The trial court declined to dismiss the members, 
noting that dismissal is the harshest sanction.370  Instead, the trial court 
limited the evidence that the plaintiffs could produce at trial to the evidence 
that was provided by the responding class members during discovery.371  
This precluded the noncompliant members from testifying or offering 
evidence at trial.372  On appeal, the defendant argued that the sanction was 
meaningless, because the nonresponsive members were not participating in 
the case and thus were never going to offer evidence or testify.373  At the 
same time, those members increase the contingency fee for plaintiffs’ 
counsel because they would still be eligible for money damages.374 
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude 
evidence.375  The court recognized the noncompliant members’ interest in 
not being unduly punished, citing Brennan.376  However, the court also 
noted that a harsher sanction would have been within the judge’s 
discretion.377 
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2.  Estoppel of New Claims 
In Arleth v. FMP Operating Co.,378 stockholders sued the issuing 
corporation and its successor in interest for securities fraud.379  The court 
denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss absentees who failed to respond to 
interrogatories concerning evidence of reliance.380  However, the court 
estopped the nonresponsive members from raising new claims or rights.381  
The court found that dismissal was an overly harsh sanction and that the 
defendants had not proven that this harsh sanction was warranted.382  
Further, the court explained that it had a duty to protect the absent members 
and to give them their day in court.383  Yet, the court recognized the 
defendants’ concern that the nonresponsive members might unfairly 
surprise the defendant by raising new claims after discovery had 
concluded.384  Accordingly, the court estopped nonresponsive members 
from raising new claims or rights.385 
3.  Monetary Sanctions 
In Wouters, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of noncompliant 
members after finding that a monetary sanction would have sufficed.386  At 
the trial level, some members had failed to respond to a set of 
interrogatories.387  Consequently, the defendant requested the award of 
attorney’s fees for the cost of preparation of the motion to dismiss.388  
However, the trial court rejected the request and instead dismissed the 
noncompliant plaintiffs.389  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with 
class counsel that the absent members’ nonresponse did not prejudice the 
defendant.390  After the interrogatories had been delivered, the defendant 
had deposed each class member and obtained full answers to the 
interrogatory questions.391 
The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred when it rejected 
the lesser sanction of attorney’s fees and dismissed the noncompliant 
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plaintiffs.392  As such, the Eleventh Circuit implied that monetary sanctions 
would have been appropriate.  Further, the court stated that the decision did 
not preclude the district court’s ability to impose lesser sanctions against the 
plaintiff or plaintiffs’ attorney.393 
By contrast, in Cruz, a district court found that monetary sanctions are 
neither feasible nor practical.394  In that case, the court considered imposing 
monetary sanctions on nonresponsive absentees but decided that the 
monetary sanctions would be difficult to collect and would not lessen the 
prejudice to the defendant.395  The Cruz court did not address the issue of 
monetary sanctions against class counsel.396 
III.  DISCOVERING A BALANCE:  SANCTIONS SHOULD DEPEND ON THE TYPE 
OF GROUP LITIGATION 
In Part III, this Note endorses a solution that combines the reasoning of 
Hernandez and Cruz.  This solution best balances defendants’ and 
plaintiffs’ interests because it takes into account the type of class action, the 
degree of prejudice to the defendant, and the level of bad faith on the part of 
the absentees.  Part III first sets guidelines for ordering discovery of 
absentees.  Then, it describes the solution and assess problems with it.  
Finally, it addresses an implication of the solution. 
A. Guidelines for Absentee Discovery 
Postcertification discovery of absentee members should continue to be a 
rare occurrence in Rule 23 class actions and state class actions, because 
such discovery is contrary to the general policy that absentee members need 
not participate in class actions.397  Courts should continue to assess whether 
discovery is warranted by analyzing whether the requested discovery is 
appropriate in that particular litigation, the defendant’s need for the 
information, and the potential burden on the absent members.398  Discovery 
requests are appropriate only where they relate to common issues and where 
the information is unavailable from the representative parties.399  Courts 
should deny complicated or technical discovery requests because such 
requests may confuse absentees.400  By confusing absentees, those requests 
may discourage absentees from remaining in the action.401 
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Absentee discovery in FLSA collective actions is common and is an 
exception to the general rule that courts should not order absentee 
discovery.402  In FLSA collective actions, members are required to 
affirmatively opt in and discovery is a crucial component of the two-step 
process.403  Accordingly, discovery requests are less suspect in these 
actions because the “party plaintiffs” are more like real parties.404  
Although courts have broad power to order discovery in FLSA cases,405 
courts should order discovery only to the extent necessary and should 
consider the burden on the party plaintiffs. 
B.  The Hernandez/Cruz Solution 
By implementing these procedures, courts will rarely have to consider 
whether to sanction noncompliant absentees.  However, if a court must 
reach this issue, the court should first send a warning to the absentees.406  
The warning should include a response deadline407 and inform the 
noncompliant absentees of the possible range of sanctions for continued 
nonresponse.408 
While a warning might intimidate some members,409 it also might 
encourage response.  More importantly, though, a court-issued warning will 
alleviate or forestall due process problems by giving the absentees notice of 
potential sanctions,410 while protecting their right to their day in court.411 
If the absentees still fail to respond after a warning, the court can begin to 
assess whether dismissal of the noncompliant absentees is warranted.  First, 
the court should consider whether the action is an opt-in class action or an 
opt-out class action.412  Generally, courts should dismiss opt-out members 
without prejudice and dismiss opt-in members with prejudice.  As the 
Hernandez court explained, an absentee’s failure to respond demonstrates 
greater bad faith in an opt-in class action than in an opt-out class action.413  
In an opt-in class action, the members have affirmatively shown interest in 
the action and thus are more like real parties.414  Accordingly, when opt-in 
members fail to respond (assuming receipt of the discovery request), they 
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are willfully ignoring the request.415  Such ignorance is grounds for a court 
to make a finding of bad faith.416 
By contrast, an opt-out member’s nonresponse could indicate either a 
lack of interest, nonreceipt of the request,417 or willful bad faith.  It is 
difficult for a court to discern which of the three motivations underlies an 
opt-out member’s nonresponse.  Accordingly, a court should not generally 
impose the harshest sanction on opt-out members, but should instead 
dismiss opt-out members without prejudice. 
Further, if an opt-out member’s discovery request or warning letter is 
returned as undeliverable, the court should decline to dismiss that 
member.418  As the Cruz court explained, members who do not receive a 
final warning letter do not receive a final opportunity to respond.419  
Similarly, members who do not receive an initial discovery request are 
never informed that their participation was required.  Because these 
members never received such notice, it would be a violation of their due 
process rights to dismiss them.420 
Next, the court should consider the degree of prejudice that the defendant 
has suffered due to the absentees’ nonresponse.421  Because courts should 
order absentee discovery only where the information is necessary to the 
defendant’s claims or defenses,422 nonresponse will usually result in great 
prejudice to the defendant.  If the discovery is necessary, there are grounds 
for harsher sanctions.423  Accordingly, if the defendant is greatly 
prejudiced, a court can consider ordering dismissal with prejudice.424  
However, courts should be more reluctant to order dismissal with prejudice 
in an opt-out class action, because it is usually unclear whether the 
absentees have acted in bad faith.425 
Finally, if the action is an opt-in class action, the court should take into 
account the level of bad faith on the part of the absent members, as the 
Hernandez court did.426  Courts should analyze the level of the absentees’ 
bad faith by considering how many warnings the absent members have 
ignored and for how long they have ignored them.427  If the opt-in absentees 
have ignored multiple warnings and/or not complied for a long period of 
time, the court should order dismissal with prejudice.428  As part of the first 
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step of this solution, the court will have already sent at least one warning.429  
Failure to respond to this warning and any subsequent warnings (assuming 
the warnings were received), demonstrates bad faith on the part of the 
absent members.430 
Because evidence of bad faith is often difficult to establish in opt-out 
class actions, dismissal with prejudice generally will not be warranted in 
such actions.  In opt-out class actions, it is difficult to discern the 
motivation behind an absentee’s nonresponse.431  Accordingly, courts will 
often be unable to assess whether such members have acted in bad faith at 
all.432  Given that evidence of bad faith is necessary for dismissal with 
prejudice,433 courts should not dismiss opt-out members with prejudice. 
To summarize, noncompliant absentees in opt-out actions should usually 
be dismissed without prejudice, and noncompliant absentees in opt-in 
actions should usually be dismissed with prejudice.434  However, a court 
can impose a harsher sanction on opt-out absentees if the defendant has 
been severely prejudiced by those absentees’ failure to respond.435  If the 
action is an opt-in class action and the absentees have acted with a high 
level of bad faith, the court should order dismissal with prejudice.436 
C.  Problems with the Hernandez/Cruz Solution 
Absent members will argue that this solution undercuts the accepted 
passive role of absent members,437 creates an opt-in action for opt-out 
members,438 and gives defendants a tactical mechanism with which to 
eliminate class members.439  Class action advocates will argue that this 
solution undermines the efficiency of class actions because it does not lead 
to a defendant obtaining a bill of peace.440  This Note discusses and rebuts 
each argument, in turn. 
First, opponents will argue that dismissing absentees distorts the passive 
role that the Supreme Court has envisioned for absent members.441  
Absentees will argue that creating a choice between response and dismissal 
forces them to be active in a class action.442  However, any sanction lesser 
than dismissal will not meaningfully ameliorate the prejudice that the 
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defendant has suffered from nonresponse.443  As previously discussed, 
discovery requests should be propounded only when the information is 
necessary to the defendant’s claims or defenses.444  It follows that the 
defendant suffers prejudice when the absentees fail to provide such 
necessary information.445 
Imposing a meaningful sanction is paramount when weighing the 
defendant’s interest in the information against the members’ interest in 
maintaining a passive role.446  Monetary sanctions against class counsel, 
exclusion of new claims, or exclusion of the nonresponsive members’ 
evidence will not ameliorate the defendant’s prejudice.447  Monetary 
sanctions against nonresponsive class members will not ameliorate the 
defendant’s prejudice and are nearly impossible to collect.448  These 
solutions do not cure the defendant’s prejudice because the nonresponsive 
members are still included in the action.449  On the other hand, an order of 
dismissal will meaningfully ameliorate a defendant’s prejudice because the 
nonresponsive members causing the prejudice will be excluded from the 
action.450 
Second, absentees will argue that dismissing opt-out members without 
prejudice in Rule 23 class actions creates an opt-in action that undermines 
the efficiency of Rule 23.451  Although dismissing opt-out members without 
prejudice undermines the efficiency of a particular case,452 such dismissal 
will not undermine the efficiency of Rule 23 class actions as a whole.  
Discovery of absent members is rarely permitted because of the strict 
standards for such discovery,453 and thus, absentee exclusion will be rare.454  
Therefore, class actions will remain an efficient mechanism that facilitates 
resolution of many similar claims. 
Third, absent members will argue that permitting dismissal of absentees 
gives defendants a tactical tool that can potentially reduce class size.455  
This concern is unfounded because courts should deny any discovery 
request that is intended to decrease class size.456  A court’s initial analysis 
of whether to permit discovery will eliminate any tactical uses of absentee 
discovery.457 
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Fourth, class action advocates will argue that ordering dismissal of opt-
out absentees without prejudice deprives defendants of a “bill of peace.”458  
When absentees are dismissed without prejudice, defendants could be 
subject to repetitive, individual suits.459  However, concern for absentees’ 
due process rights outweigh defendants’ need for a bill of peace.  As 
previously discussed, the motivation behind an opt-out member’s 
nonresponse is unclear.460  Because an opt-out absentee may not have 
received the discovery request, dismissal could be without notice to that 
absentee.461  As such, absentee dismissal implicates due process concerns 
about notice and the right to be heard.462  Dismissal without prejudice 
forestalls or ameliorates these due process problems because it allows an 
absentee to continue pursuing a claim.463 
The proposed solution has implications for the Rule 23(b)(3)(A) 
requirement that courts assess the class members’ interest in individually 
controlling the prosecution of their claim.464  Absentees may refuse to 
respond to a discovery request because they lack interest in the claims465 or 
wish to bring their claims individually.466  A lack of response may indicate 
that the absentees want to individually control the litigation and would 
prefer that a class action not be maintained on their behalf.  Accordingly, if 
many absentees fail to respond to discovery requests, there may be grounds 
for a court to decertify a class.467 
CONCLUSION 
Courts are in disagreement about whether dismissal is an appropriate 
sanction when absentees fail to respond to postcertification discovery 
requests.  This issue implicates due process concerns and raises questions 
about the role, rights, and duties of absent members.  Courts should strive to 
impose a sanction that ameliorates the defendant’s prejudice while 
recognizing absent members’ due process rights. 
Courts should dismiss nonresponsive absentees because dismissal is the 
only sanction that meaningfully ameliorates a defendant’s prejudice.  
Courts can protect absentees’ due process rights by issuing a warning of 
potential sanctions.  Yet, when opt-out absentees fail to respond, it is 
difficult for courts to discern whether that nonresponse is in bad faith.  
Accordingly, courts should generally dismiss nonresponsive opt-out 
members without prejudice.  By contrast, because opt-in absentees have 
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shown interest in the class action, their nonresponse is in bad faith.  
Therefore, courts should generally dismiss nonresponsive opt-in members 
with prejudice. 
